A guest post from a friend, NoblemanPH, a student of IRBS. The reader may read this article in Academia.
The Christological debates in early church history have proven to be of great benefit for all Christians for the millennia to come. The ecumenical creeds of Nicene, Chalcedon, and others have effectively ward off heresies regarding the Person and Work of Christ. As orthodox Christology continues to advance in the modern era, it has become evident that the creeds of the past need not be abandoned but should always be reaffirmed and contemplated to preserve and defend the historic catholic view of the Person and Work of our glorious Messiah. The rise of Kenotic Christology in the 19th century, which continues to influence some conservative and evangelical Christians today, is a great example of why we must always look to the past and consider the faith handed down to us as we worship and meditate on the glorious life of our two-natured Redeemer.
The 'success' of the Enlightenment in the 17th century had proven to have a negative effect on Classical theology in general and on the orthodox view of Christology in particular. As the modern era entered, it became evident that theologians of that day were about to drift away from creedal Christology in an attempt to pacify the theological pressures in their time. In the 19th century, this led to the rise of Kenotic Christology, which, upon closer inspection, would be a distinct, new Christological position neither supported by Scripture nor even suggested in the great tradition. Born in a time when the culture was obsessed with the psychological consciousness of a human person and where religion was preoccupied with the historical Jesus, Kenoticism protested for a just and accurate understanding of the true humanity of the incarnate Son. By doing so, they would argue that, for Christ to be truly man, the divine Word must voluntarily give up some of His divinity to allow His human nature to function as truly human. In other words, in the incarnation, the Second Person of the Trinity had to empty Himself—thus the word kenosis from the Greek κενόω, meaning 'to empty'—of certain divine attributes to allow His human nature to operate. Upon closer look, this resulted in an excessive emphasis on Christ's humanity to the detriment of His true divinity. As Dolezal helpfully summarized:
Kenoticism is a Christological perspective that emerged in the nineteenth century that is concerned to take seriously the humanity of the incarnate Word with all its essential limitations…Kenoticism aims to secure certain truths about Christ's manhood at the expense of other orthodox Christian doctrines about the Logos's divine nature and person. It does so to make space for the restrictions of his human nature.1
The Kenotic movement is not a monolithic endeavor in and of itself and can be categorized into two variations: the hard and soft versions of kenoticism.2 Behind these are a line of theologians, both old and recent, that can be seen to consistently hold a form of Kenoticism. The inception of this doctrine can be traced to the 19th century, first in Germany, with men like Frederic Godet and Wolfgang Friedrich Gess, who held to a much more radical kenotic view than the milder version of Gottfried Thomasius. This novel Christology was then championed in the late 19th century in England by men like Charles Gore and Frank Weston.3 In recent times, following along with the theologizing of Thomasius, men like Donald Macleod, C. Stephen Evans, and Stephen T. Davis are considered to be some of the modern Kenoticists.4
To further examine this doctrinal position, with a particular focus on contemporary kenotic theologians, it must be noted that most who adhere to this doctrine do not necessarily deny the divinity of Christ.5 Rather, what they are trying to posit is that the divine Word in the incarnation must restrict His 'Godhood' to some degree to accommodate the human nature which is in union with Him. In other words, their unflinching insistence on the true humanity of Christ must necessarily lead to the notion that the Second Person of the Trinity must give up some of His divine attributes as a result of the Hypostatic Union. Some of the attributes that must be relinquished by the Son include, but are not limited to, His omnipotence, omnipresence, and omniscience. To allow this language is to allow the divine Person of the Son to be subject to mutability and passibility, among other things. The contemporary American philosopher C. Stephen Evans is certainly arguing along this line when he said:
If one begins with the classical conception of God as timeless and absolutely immutable, the answer must be that the Incarnation involves no change at all in the divine nature…However…It seems safe to say that a conception of God as timeless and immutable would not be the most natural view of God if one took seriously the idea that the Incarnation itself is our primary window into God's being. For the Incarnation seems to shout to us that God is intimately involved in the temporal world and capable of change that is radical and even shocking in character. What is missing…if we think of the Incarnation merely as the temporal outcome of a timeless divine intention, is any sense that God himself enters the human condition, takes on human flesh, and experiences reality as a human does. If there is no change in God, what could it mean to say that God himself takes on human nature? A real Incarnation must not be merely an addition to God; it must make some difference to God and in God.6
Donald Macleod, another contemporary theologian, by making the Person of the Son more relatable to creatures, described the incarnation and the relationship between Christ's divinity and humanity in a vein similar to Evans'. Calling his own view the true kenosis, he said:
He possessed all the majesty of deity, performed all its functions and enjoyed all its prerogatives. He was adored by his Father and worshipped by the angels. He was invulnerable to pain, frustration and embarrassment. He existed in unclouded serenity. His supremacy was total, his satisfaction complete, his blessedness perfect. Such a condition was not something he had secured by effort. It was the way things were, and had always been; and there was no reason why they should change. But change they did, and they changed because of the second element involved in the kenosis: Christ did not insist on his rights…he did not regard being equal with God as a harpagmos.7
These assertions are, suffice to say, representative of Kenoticism, especially of the recent Christological milieu. By allowing the Logos to undergo change in the incarnation, they can contend for the 'true kenosis' through which the Word Himself experienced divine limitations as He took to Himself human nature. In this line of theologizing, they would interpret the kenotic passage of Philippians 2:6-7 as such, claiming that the divine Logos "in order to become man, made an unspeakable surrender of some divine prerogatives."8 Similarly, when Paul proclaimed in 2 Corinthians 8:9 that 'though Christ was rich, yet for our sake He became poor, so that you through His poverty might become rich,' the Kenoticists would argue using the same principle, interpreting it as the Son, stepping from "riches to beggary, from the fullness of an all-comprehending divine life to one restricted to the temporal and local limits of our humanity."9 Lastly, the language of the Gospel of John, particularly in John 17:5, wherein seemingly there was a 'set-aside' glory of Christ before the foundation of the world, was interpreted by a kenotic theologian as to mean Christ's "state of divine glory appertains to His nature," to which "He has voluntarily renounced it in order to serve God here on earth."10 It can be observed, then, that for the Kenoticists, the necessity of limiting the divinity of the Logos to make room for His human nature seems to rest on their presumption that the incarnational union of the two natures is compositional.11
While Kenoticism can certainly, to some degree, hold its ground through exegesis of the Scriptures, it was in the historical-theological aspect that it certainly cannot stand. Even proponents of this view admit, quite honestly, that this Christological teaching has little or no support in Christian antiquity.12 Thus, to rectify this doctrinal error, one must look back in the past and consider the faith handed down to us. The ecumenical creeds of the old, especially that of Chalcedon, do not allow, in any degree, a kenotic interpretation of the incarnation and of the Hypostatic Union. As the Chalcedonian Definition confessed:
"Wherefore, following the holy Fathers, we all with one voice confess our Lord Jesus Christ one and the same Son, the same perfect in Godhead, the same perfect in manhood, truly God and truly man, the same consisting of a reasonable soul and a body, of one substance with the Father as touching the Godhead, the same of one substance with us as touching the manhood, like us in all things apart from sin; begotten of the Father before the ages as touching the Godhead, the same in the last days, for us and for our salvation, born from the Virgin Mary, the Theotokos, as touching the manhood, one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, to be acknowledged in two natures, without confusion, without change, without division, without separation; the distinction of natures being in no way abolished because of the union, but rather the characteristic property of each nature being preserved, and concurring into one Person and one subsistence, not as if Christ were parted or divided into two persons, but one and the same Son and only-begotten God, Word, Lord, Jesus Christ; even as the Prophets from the beginning spoke concerning him, and our Lord Jesus Christ instructed us, and the Creed of the Fathers has handed down to us."13
Using Chalcedon as the lens, Kenoticism can be argued against by appealing to the Definition's language and its underlying presuppositions. First, to confess that the 'Lord Jesus Christ is truly God and of one substance with the Father as touching to Godhead' means that He can in no way be subject to any sort of change whatsoever. As very God of very God, in the simplicity of His absolute being, the Logos remains perfectly immutable and impassible, as the incarnate One. Allowing Him to undergo change by setting aside some of His divine attributes in the incarnation means that He is not truly God. As Weinandy comments,
The basic concept used by the Kenoticists destroys the immutability of God whether it be… "real self-emptying" and "abandonment" of certain divine prerogatives, or… "self-restraint". The Logos must cease to be fully God and thus change. Such a change is not only impossible since God is immutable, but is even impossible to conceive.14
Second, since the above is true, how then should one articulate the kenotic language in the Scriptures without violating the emphasis of Chalcedon on the true humanity and, especially, the true divinity of the One Christ? In other words, how should we describe the Son's 'self-emptying' in a way that preserves the integrity of the Hypostatic Union? To answer that question is first to acknowledge and confess that the union of the human and divine natures in the divine Logos, or the Word's becoming in the incarnation, should not be conceived as compositional. As Chalcedon asserted, the 'one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, must be acknowledged in two natures, without confusion, without change, without division, without separation; the distinction of natures being in no way abolished because of the union, but rather the characteristic property of each nature being preserved.' Weinandy is again helpful:
As soon as one sees the incarnational act, the "becoming," not as the substantial compositional union of natures forming a new being, but as the person of the Logos taking on a new manner or mode of existence, of coming to be, coming to exist as man, the questions and problems as seen…disappear. The "becoming" no longer threatens the immutable divinity of the Logos, nor the integrity of the manhood, but just the opposite. It establishes and guarantees that it is the Logos, in his unqualified divinity, who now is and exists as man. Thus as man the Logos, without any change in his divine nature, possesses a human intellect and will, and thus human consciousness and knowledge.15
In other words, contra kenoticism, Chalcedonian Christology maintains that in the incarnation, there was no divestment or augmentation made to the Logos, as He was always immutable and impassible. Rather, the Word takes a human nature to Himself in such a manner that it was His own divine person that supplies the personhood or the 'whoness' of the human nature. In the incarnation, it was human nature—not the divine Logos—that underwent change and glory as it was being perfected or completed by the person of the Son. That is to say, the 'newness' that can only be attributed to the Word is a new mode of existence as He, as the incarnate One, now assumes a created human nature unto Himself. Lastly, by allowing Chalcedon to be our lodestar in predicating Christ as the God-man, all texts that seemingly favor a kenotic interpretation must be reinterpreted in light of the language of traditional Christian Christology. In other words, the 'self-emptying' in Philippians 2:6-7 does not mean that the Logos gave up His divine prerogatives, but He emptied Himself in the sense that He took to Himself human nature, with a true body and a reasonable soul, and now exists in a new manner as the God-Man. Through this lens, we can properly describe Christ as rich who became poor and as the One who came down from heaven to earth. By assuming a human nature and becoming a man, the Son of God humbled himself by becoming obedient to the point of death, even death on a cross.
It can be argued that Kenotic Christology as a whole is nothing but an old heresy dressed in new clothes. One who is conversant with church history can readily find a semblance of this teaching in the heresy of Eutychianism. If Eutyches excessively emphasized the divinity of Christ at the expense of His humanity, Kenoticists swung the pendulum to the other side by excessively emphasizing His humanity at the expense of His deity. As history tells us, Christ's true humanity and true divinity must be unequivocally maintained. If Christ is not truly God, the whole dogma of the Christian faith will certainly collapse. It would mean that believers are worshipping a creature, amounting to the gross sin of idolatry. With respect to salvation, it means that we are still in our sins and our faith is in vain, since a mere man cannot bear the fullness of God's wrath and cannot secure us eternal life. Yet since our Lord and Savior is both God and Man, the Logos took on flesh and blood for our sake, and by the infinite value of His sacrificial death, all who repent and believe in Him will definitely be saved to the uttermost.
Bibliography
Davis, Leo Donald. The First Seven Ecumenical Councils (325-787): Their History and Theology. Theology and Life Series 21. Michael Glazier, Inc., 1987.
Dolezal, James E. "Against Kenoticism and for Kenosis." A Faithful Steward: Essays in Honor of Richard C. Barcellos. Edited by James P. Butler, David A. Charles, D. Scott Meadows, Cameron G. Porter, and Micah T. Renihan. Broken Wharfe, 2026.
Evans, C. Stephen. "Kenotic Christology and the Nature of God." Exploring Kenotic Christology: The Self-Emptying of God. Edited by C. Stephen Evans. Regent College Publishing, 2010.
Godet, Frederic Louis. Commentary on John's Gospel. Kregel Publications, 1978.
Macleod, Donald. The Person of Christ. Contours of Christian Theology. Edited by Gerald Bray. Inter-Varsity Press, 1998.
Weinandy, Thomas G. Does God Change? The Word's Becoming in the Incarnation. Vol. IV of Studies in Historical Theology. St. Bede's Publications, 1985.
Footnotes
Footnotes
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James E. Dolezal, "Against Kenoticism and for Kenosis," in A Faithful Steward: Essays in Honor of Richard C. Barcellos, ed. James P. Butler et al. (Broken Wharfe, 2026) chapter 15. ↩
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Dolezal, "Against Kenoticism and for Kenosis," 311. ↩
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See Thomas G. Weinandy, Does God Change? The Word's Becoming in the Incarnation, vol. IV of Studies in Historical Theology (St. Bede's Publications, 1985), 101–23. ↩
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See Dolezal, "Against Kenoticism and for Kenosis." ↩
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Dolezal, "Against Kenoticism and for Kenoonsis," 311. ↩
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C. Stephen Evans, "Kenotic Christology and the Nature of God," in Exploring Kenotic Christology: The Self-Emptying of God, ed. C. Stephen Evans (Regent College Publishing, 2010), 197. ↩
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Donald Macleod, The Person of Christ, Contours of Christian Theology, ed. Gerald Bray (Inter-Varsity Press, 1998), 213–14 emphasis original. ↩
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David W. Forrest, The Authority of Christ (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1906), 98, quoted in Dolezal, "Against Kenoticism and for Kenosis," 317. ↩
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David W. Forrest, The Authority of Christ (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1906), 337, quoted in Dolezal, "Against Kenoticism and for Kenosis," 322. ↩
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Frederic Louis Godet, Commentary on John's Gospel (Kregel Publications, 1978), 889. ↩
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Weinandy, Does God Change?, 116. ↩
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Weinandy, Does God Change?, 114. ↩
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The Chalcedonian Definition, quoted in Leo Donald Davis, The First Seven Ecumenical Councils (325-787): Their History and Theology, Theology and Life Series 21 (Michael Glazier, Inc., 1987), 186. ↩
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Weinandy, Does God Change?, 114. ↩
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Weinandy, Does God Change?, 119. ↩
